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Abstract 
This paper describes a number of techniques for GNSS 
navigation message authentication. A detailed analysis 
of the security facilitated by navigation message 
authentication is given. The analysis takes into 
consideration the risk of critical applications that rely 
on GPS including transportation, finance and 
telecommunication networks. We propose a number of 
cryptographic authentication schemes for navigation 
data authentication. These authentication schemes 
provide authenticity and integrity of the navigation data 
to the receiver. 
Through software simulation, the performance of the 
schemes is quantified. The use of software simulation 
enables the collection of authentication performance 
data of different data channels, and the impact of 
various schemes on the infrastructure and receiver. 
Navigation message authentication schemes have been 
simulated at the proposed data rates of Galileo and GPS 
services, for which the resulting performance data is 
presented.  
This paper concludes by making recommendations for 
optimal implementation of navigation message 
authentication for Galileo and next generation GPS 
systems. 
 
Introduction 
 
Security services in GNSS can serve two purposes: First 
as a mitigation of the security vulnerabilities in GNSS 
and second as an application service. 
• Security for mitigation: Security services can 
be used to provide a level of anti-spoofing for 
civil applications. This is particularly pertinent 
for applications that are safety or financially 
critical. Such critical applications range from 
tracking and timing applications to Safety of 
Life applications. An example of critical 
applications includes tracking of hazardous 
materials, power-phase synchronization, and 
transportation systems. 
• Security as a service: Security can be used by 
applications as a service. An example of this is 
a scenario where legal traceability is needed. 
Security services could facilitate a method of 
providing location and time guarantees for a 
particular sequence of events, such as a car 
accident. In addition, security can be used to 
support applications such as secure time 
stamping and location-based access control. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. First existing 
classes of security protection mechanisms suitable for 
GNSS are introduced. Security and operational aspects 
of these mechanisms are discussed, and an overview of 
next generation civil satellite navigation signals is given 
with a focus on the security protection mechanisms that 
are currently planned. 
The paper then provides an in-depth analysis on 
Navigation Message Authentication (NMA) and 
introduces proposals for two NMA schemes. The 
schemes presented are based on signal and navigation 
message specifications for next generation GPS. 
Through our simulation tools, we are able to analyze the 
implementation possibilities on next generation GPS as 
an indicator as to what is possible for Galileo. Security 
and performance results of these schemes are discussed.  
The paper concludes with a discussion of the 
applicability of these authentication schemes to Galileo, 
satellite and ground based augmentation systems. 
 
Classes of Security Protection for GNSS  
 
Security protection schemes for GNSS can be 
categorized into three classes: 
Navigation Data Authentication and Cryptographic 
Integrity Protection Mechanisms 
A navigation data authentication mechanism facilitates 
corroboration of the origin of data. Implicitly, this 
service provides data integrity, as unauthorized 
modification of a message results in a changed source 
of the data. Cryptographic integrity protection ensures 
information is not altered by unauthorized means by 
providing detection of such data manipulation. 
Navigation Message Authentication (NMA) is one such 
mechanism designed to overcome spoofing and to 
provide increased safety and service guarantees. An 
NMA scheme would add authentication messages to the 
navigation message stream, both authenticating the 
source and providing cryptographic integrity protection 
of the navigation data.  
Should an adversary attempt to generate or change the 
navigation data, a receiver would be able to detect the 
activity. An adversary would not be able to simulate the 
authentication message, as he would not have the keys 
required to generate them. 
Signal Access Control Mechanisms 
A signal access control mechanism facilitates restriction 
of access to the signal from unauthorized users. GPS 
and Galileo signals use Direct Sequence Spread 
Spectrum (DSSS) and CDMA for both navigation 
function, through the pseudorange estimation process, 
and data modulation. Access to the signal can be 
restricted through Spreading Code Encryption (SCE), in 
which the secret spreading code is generated using a 
symmetric key and some type of stream-cipher. Only 
users with the key are able to generate the secret 
spreading code which then allows correlation and 
dispreading of the signal. 
SCE can be used as a mitigation measure for spoofing 
or as a mechanism to support fee-paying services. 
Secure key distribution and management are 
particularly important in the use of SCE. Should the 
symmetric key be compromised, all users of the signal 
would require re-keying.  
Asymmetric encryption methods and public key 
infrastructure (PKI) can be used to facilitate secure 
loading of keys, and electronic re-keying when 
required. 
Navigation Data Access Control Mechanisms 
A navigation data access control mechanism facilitates 
restriction of access to parts or all of a navigation data 
stream modulated over a given signal. 
Navigation Data Encryption (NDE) can be used to 
support a variety of fee-paying value added services, or 
for example, to provide multiple levels of accuracy / 
availability, where non-encrypted navigation data such 
as ephemeris and clock correction terms are biased and 
corrections to the biased terms are given in an encrypted 
field which would accessed on a fee-paying basis. 
  
Security Status of GNSS 
 
This section provides a brief overview of the currently 
known status of civil signals in next generation satellite 
navigation systems and their support for security.  
The next generation GPS will provide new civil 
services on the L2 and L5 frequencies. Table 1 lists the 
services, data rates and signals they operate on (Fontana 
et al. 2001) (Barker et al. 2000). No future civil services 
are currently projected to provide security protection 
mechanisms. 
Signal Data 
Modulated 
SCE Data Rate 
symbol/s 
(bit/s) 
Service 
L1Q Yes No 50 (50) L1 C/A 
L2Q Yes No 25 (50) L2 Civil 
L5I Yes No 50 (100) L5 Civil 
L5Q No No -- L5 Civil 
Table 1. New Civil GPS Signals 
Galileo will provide four navigation services and one 
search and rescue service. A free of charge position and 
timing service will be broadcasted by the Open Service 
(OS). A guaranteed service providing timely warnings 
about the integrity will be implemented by the Safety of 
Life Service (SoL).  
Two additional signals that allow service guarantee and 
increased accuracy, cryptographic integrity, a higher 
data rate throughput and limited broadcasting capacity 
will be provided by the Commercial Service (CS). 
Other two controlled access signals will provide 
position and timing to government controlled users in 
the Public Regulated Service (PRS) (Hein et al. 2002). 
Table 2 lists the security services projected to be 
included on each signal. 
Signal Data 
Mod 
SCE NMA NDE Data 
Rate 
Sym./s 
(bit/s) 
Serv. 
E2-L1-E1A Yes Yes
2 No Yes TBD 
(TBD) 
PRS 
E2-L1-E1B Yes No Yes
1
 CS 
Only 
250 
(125) 
OS / 
SoL / 
CS 
E2-L1-E1C Pilot No -- -- -- OS / 
SoL / 
CS 
E5aI Yes No Yes
1 No 50 (25) OS / 
SoL 
E5aQ Pilot No -- -- -- OS / 
SoL 
E5bI Yes No Yes
1
 CS 
Only 
250 
(125) 
OS / 
SoL / 
CS 
E5bQ Pilot No -- -- -- OS / 
SoL / 
CS 
E6A Yes Yes
2 No Yes TBD 
(TBD) 
PRS 
E6B Yes Yes
3 No Yes 1000 
(500) 
CS 
E6C Pilot Yes
3 -- -- -- CS 
Table 2. GALILEO Signals  
 
 
Navigation Message Authentication (NMA) 
 
This section provides a detailed discussion of 
Navigation Message Authentication (NMA), the 
security protection afforded by its use, requirements for 
the development of NMA schemes and performance 
considerations. 
A conceptual implementation of NMA is illustrated in 
Figure 1, in which both a simple and certified receiver 
are shown. A simple receiver would not offer any 
guarantee of service but would have full accuracy, 
simply ignoring the authentication messages. A certified 
                                                          
1
 Navigation Message Authentication may be included 
on the Open Service depending on feasibility analyses. 
(European Space Agency. (2002). "GALILEO Mission 
High Level Definition.") 
2
 Government Spreading Code Encryption 
3
 Commercial Spreading Code Encryption 
receiver would contain the appropriate cryptographic 
algorithms to decode the authentication messages and 
verify the other messages in the stream. 
Figure 1 illustrates the use of asymmetric encryption 
techniques for generating the authentication message, 
with a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) supporting the 
NMA scheme.   
CERTIFIED 
RECEIVER
NMA Scheme
(Crypto 
Algorithms)
OS NAV Messages
Public Key 
Cert PRNn
(Galileo Op.)
GALILEO
CONTROLAuthentication 
Message
SIMPLE 
RECEIVER
GALILEO 
CA Cert
Full Service 
Guarantee
No Service 
Guarantee
Navigation Data Upload incl.:
- Authentication Messages 
  signed with PrivKPRNn
- Public Key Certificate PRNn 
- Public Key Certificate of   
  GALILEO Operator
Private KeyPRNn
Public Key 
Cert Gal. 
Op(Galileo 
Cert Auth.)
 
Figure 1. Navigation Message Authentication4 
 
A public key certificate from the Galileo root 
Certification Authority (CA), pre-installed on the 
receiver, facilitates verification of the public key 
certificate of the Galileo operator subordinate CA which 
is broadcast to the receiver periodically with the public 
key certificate for each satellite.  
The public key certificate for each satellite is issued by 
the Galileo operator CA, certifying the satellite’s public 
key. The receiver is able to verify the public key and 
corresponding private key used to generate the 
authentication messages are in fact from the Galileo 
operator and not an adversary attempting to generate 
authentication messages with keys they have generated. 
A more in-depth discussion on PKI is given later in this 
paper. 
Security protection afforded by NMA 
NMA provides data-level anti-spoofing functionality 
through the use of authentication messages, which 
provide origin authentication and cryptographic 
integrity of the navigation message stream. NMA 
significantly increases the complexity of spoofing a 
legitimate signal through simulation, however, it has a 
security limitation in that the messages could 
theoretically be acquired by a receiver and modulated 
over a simulated signal in order to spoof the Galileo 
signal.  
This would require functionality that is not commonly 
found in commercial signal simulators, and would 
require the operation to be performed within a very 
small time window. This type of attack would require 
significant cost in terms of engineering skills and 
equipment. We are currently working on mitigation 
                                                          
4
 Figure based on concepts from Galilei Consortium. 
(2003). "The Galilei Project: GALILEO Design 
Consolidation." 
strategies that address this problem, and are confident in 
achieving a high-level of anti-spoofing protection for 
civil receivers. 
NMA Requirements 
GNSS data channels are characteristically slow to 
ensure optimum navigation performance. This and the 
need for optimum alert times for integrity failure, result 
in a number of requirements for an NMA scheme on 
GNSS as given below: 
• Efficient verification: As GNSS receivers may 
have limited computational power, the 
overhead for verification of the authentication 
message should be low; 
• Fast authentication: In order to maintain a low 
time-to-alert of integrity / authentication 
failure, it is imperative that the authentication 
is fast and as close to real-time as possible; 
• Loss-tolerance: Robustness of the 
authentication scheme to message loss is 
critical in order to maintain high time-to-alert 
rates. This is particularly pertinent in the case 
of GNSS, which broadcasts the navigation 
data. In the case of data corruption or loss, a 
receiver must wait till the message is next 
transmitted. Mechanisms such as Forward 
Error Correction (FEC) and Cyclic 
Redundancy Checks (CRC) assist in reducing 
data corruption and loss; 
• Scalability: Scalability is a key requirement for 
authentication in GNSS. The number of 
receivers should be independent of the 
authentication scheme. In addition, the key 
distribution mechanisms used should be 
scalable; and 
• Low Communications Overhead: As data 
channels in GPS/Galileo have very limited 
bandwidth, the authentication scheme must be 
very efficient in terms of communications 
overhead. 
NMA Performance Considerations 
There are a number of considerations that must be 
addressed in an NMA scheme. In particular, the 
performance of satellite navigation systems, in terms of 
delays for broadcasting ephemeris and clock correction 
terms, must be balanced with the need and desired 
performance levels for authentication. 
The Galileo Mission High-Level Definition (European 
Space Agency 2002) states: 
“Capability to authenticate the signal (e.g. by a 
digital signature) must be transparent and non-
discriminatory to users and shall not introduce 
any degradation in performances.” 
A balance must be obtained where NMA performance 
is sufficient without resulting in degradation in 
performance. Table 3 details the maximum broadcast 
intervals for various CNAV messages on the GPS L2C 
signal. As Galileo navigation message are yet to be 
defined, there is currently no performance data 
available. 
 
Message Data Message Type 
Number 
Maximum 
Broadcast 
Intervals 
Ephemeris 10 & 11 48 sec 
Clock Type 30’s 48 sec 
ISC, IONO 305 288 sec 
Reduced Almanac 315 or 12 20 min6 
Midi Almanac 375 120 min6 
EOP 325 30 min 
UTC 335 288 sec 
Diff Correction 345 or 13 & 14 30 min7 
GGTO 355 288 sec 
Text 365 or 15 As required 
Table 3. Maximum CNAV Message Broadcast Intervals (ARINC 
Engineering 2004). 
 
Depending on the performance of the NMA schemes, 
the time-to-alarm for authentication / integrity failure 
may be outside the time-to-alarm requirements of some 
Safety of Life (SoL) applications for non-intentional 
integrity failures. For example, GPS used in time-
critical applications would be more sensitive to long 
time-to-alert periods than applications such as 
hazardous materials tracking or secure time stamping. 
Integrity performance requirements for the Safety of 
Life Service (SoL) service are detailed in Table 4. 
These requirements were derived from service levels 
that are stipulated by law or are recommended best 
practices for all considered domains of transportation 
e.g. aviation, maritime and rail (European Space 
Agency 2002).  
 
SoL Integrity 
Service Level 
A B C 
Coverage World 
Land 
Masses 
Global Global 
Alarm Limit H: 40m 
V: 20m 
H: 556m 
V: -m 
H: 25m 
V: -m 
Time-To-Alarm 6s 10s 10s 
Integrity Risk 3.5 x 10-7/ 
150s 
period 
10-7/ 
1hr period 
10-5/ 
1hr period 
Continuity Risk 8 x 10-6/ 
15s 
period 
(TBD)/ 
1hr period 
3 x 10-4/ 
3hr period 
Availability 99.5% 99.5% 99.5% 
Applications Aviation, 
APV II, 
Road, Rail 
Aviation 
en-route to 
NPA 
Maritime 
Table 4. GALILEO Safety of Life Service Characteristics (Galilei 
Consortium 2003) 
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 Type 30 messages contain clock correction 
parameters. 
6
 Maximum broadcast interval for a complete set of SVs 
in the constellation. 
7
 Only applicable when differential corrections are 
available. 
Integrity in this context is defined to be the ability of a 
system to provide timely warnings to the user when it 
fails to meet certain margins of accuracy. SoL data 
including integrity and Signal in Space Accuracy 
(SISA) aim to facilitate the required time-to-alarms in 
Table 4.  
It is our belief that some SoL applications may 
additionally require equivalent time-to-alarms for 
authentication / cryptographic integrity failure caused 
by intentional interference such as spoofing. Such 
intentional interference could be potentially disastrous 
in safety critical applications.  
 
Proposed Authentication Schemes 
 
This section discusses the assumptions, message 
configuration and Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) used 
in the proposals and the corresponding performance 
analyses.  
In the absence of a NAV message structure and 
indications of the required broadcast intervals, we have 
designed the schemes around the CNAV navigation 
message structure for the GPS L2C signal.  
A CNAV message is a 300 bit message composed of a 
38 bit header containing the satellite PRN ID, a 
message ID, the Time of Week (TOW) and an alert flag 
to indicate that the User Range Accuracy (URA) may 
be worse than indicated. CNAV messages also contain a 
24 bit Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) (ARINC 
Engineering 2004). (Refer to Figure 2) 
 
 
Figure 2. GPS L2C CNAV Message 
 
CNAV messages can be sequenced in 36 second
8
 
sequences of three messages or 48 second sequence of 
four messages. Only these sequencing options provide 
performance that meets the maximum broadcast 
intervals of navigation data required for the GPS L2C. 
(Refer to Table 3 for maximum broadcast intervals) 
The sequencing of navigation messages is arbitrary, but 
broadcast for optimal performance. The 48 second 
sequence offers the best performance for NMA. Figure 
3 illustrates the 48 second message sequence, in which 
type 10 and 11 ephemeris messages are required to be 
broadcast every sequence in order to meet the 
maximum broadcast interval requirements, allowing 
two messages allocations for the scheduling of the other 
messages including the proposed authentication 
messages. 
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 Based on the bit rate of the GPS L2C data channel. 
 
 
Figure 3. CNAV Message Sequence of 48 Seconds (L2C) 
 
Qascom has developed a GNSS security simulator for 
simulation of NMA for various message structures and 
phasing configurations. The CNAV structure defined 
for performance analysis of the NMA schemes is based 
on the IS-GPS-200 Interface Specification (ARINC 
Engineering 2004). An example message phasing 
configuration is illustrated in Figure 4, where message 
type 60 and 61 are the two messages used for NMA. 
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Figure 4. CNAV Message Phasing with NMA 
 
 
Public Key Infrastructure 
Public key infrastructure (PKI) is integral in providing a 
framework for distribution of public keys in a trusted 
way. The operational environment of a GNSS PKI is 
unique, in that all communication to the receiver is via 
broadcast data channels. Revocation has to be handled 
differently from standard PKIs, as it has to be assumed 
that the receiver has no access to on-line certificate 
revocation information.  
Revocation could be facilitated through an alert flag in 
the authentication message, indicating that the receiver 
must obtain a new operator certificate before it can 
continue to verify the cryptographic integrity of 
navigation messages. 
An example model of a GNSS PKI is illustrated in 
Figure 5. A certified receiver must have the Galileo CA 
certificate pre-installed, hypothetically by the receiver 
manufacturer. The Galileo operator certificate would be 
broadcast in the navigation message stream, such that 
the receiver is able to verify the operator CA certificate 
using the Galileo CA certificate. 
 
GALILEO Certification 
Authority
(Root CA)
GALILEO Operator
(Subordinate CA)
Navigation & System 
Control Center
GALILEO 
Operator 
Registration 
Authority
Request for 
Issue of Cert
Certificate
Public Key 
Cert PRNn
(Galileo Op.)
PubKPRNn
PrivKPRNn
Public Key 
Cert (Galileo 
Cert Auth.)
PubKPRNn
Request Cert for 
PubKPRNn
Public Key 
Cert PRNn
(Galileo Op.)  
Figure 5. Example Public Key Infrastructure 
 
The use of a subordinate CA allows for periodic re-
keying of the satellites, and supports revocation and 
issue of new operator CA certificates. 
Table 5 and Table 6 illustrate binary certificates based 
on X.509 optimized for transmission in CNAV 
messages. The key sizes are based on the use of Elliptic 
Curve Cryptography, and a selection of curves that is 
considered safe by the National Institute for Standards 
and Technology (NIST) (NIST 1999). 
 
Certificate Field Size (bits) 
Serial Number 32 
Valid From 32 
Valid To 32 
Issuer 192 
Satellite PRN ID 6 
Satellite Public Key 163 
Operation Center CA 
Signature Algorithm9 
6 
Operation Center CA 
Signature 
566 
Table 5. Binary Satellite Certificate Format for CNAV 
  
 
Certificate Field Size (bits) 
Serial Number 32 
Valid From 32 
Valid To 32 
Issuer 192 
Subject (Operator) 192 
Operator Public Key 283 
CA Signature 
Algorithm9 
6 
CA Signature 566 
Table 6. Binary Operator CA Certificate Format for CNAV 
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 These bits define the algorithm type and the elliptic 
curve to be used. 
NMA using EC-DSA Signature Scheme 
 
A Navigation Message Authentication scheme based on 
concepts from the Galilei project design consolidation 
(Galilei Consortium 2003) is discussed in this section.  
The authentication scheme is based on the broadcast of 
digital signatures of sequences of messages. Elliptic 
Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EC-DSA) was 
chosen for this implementation due to the small key and 
digital signature sizes. 
The message structure for this scheme is illustrated in 
Figure 6, where A denotes a satellite. 
 
 
Figure 6. Message Structure 
 
In a given timeslot of 96 seconds, a signature of two 
sequences of messages except type 60 and 61 messages 
is calculated. The signature, SigA(MSEQ), and public 
key certificates of A and the operator, are broadcast in 
type 60 and 61 messages. These messages are broadcast 
alternately in each message sequence, such that in a 
given timeslot, both message types 60 and 61 are 
received. 
It is assumed that CertA is issued by a Certification 
Authority (CA), such as the Galileo Operator CA. The 
operator certificate is transmitted in 54 packets of 25 
bits. Each satellite transmits from a different index in 
the set of 54 packets, such that time to acquire all parts 
is reduced significantly as the parts and be acquired 
from all visible satellites. 
The receiver must only accept SigA(MSEQ) if it is able 
to verify the public key of A and SigA(MSEQ) is 
successfully verified. 
Performance 
This scheme was simulated with the security simulator 
developed by Qascom. A summary of the key 
performance indicators are detailed in Table 7. As can 
be seen by these results, the time-to-alarms for 
cryptographic integrity failure are outside all time-to-
alarm requirements for class A, B and C SoL 
applications. (Refer to Table 4) 
 
 GPS 
L2C 
(25 
bps) 
GPS 
L5 
(50 
bps) 
Galileo 
OS E2-
L1-E1B 
(125 
bps) 
Galileo 
OS 
E5AI 
(25 
bps) 
Galileo 
OS 
E6BI 
(125 
bps) 
Time-To-
Alarm 
96s 48s 19,2s 96s 19,2s 
Cert 
Acquisition 
Time 
(PRNn 
Cert) 
864s 432s 172,8s 864s 172,8s 
Cert 
Acquisition 
Time 
(Operator) 
10 
840s 420s 168s 840s 168s 
Table 7. Performance of NMA using Digital Signatures 
 
Security of the Scheme 
The strength of a particular signature depends on all the 
links in the security chain. This includes the signature 
and hash algorithms used, as well as the strength of key 
generation. In particular, the security of EC-DSA 
requires the careful selection of both key sizes and 
elliptic curve domain parameters. The parameters and 
key sizes chosen in the design of this scheme are 
recommended curves that are considered safe by the 
National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) 
(NIST 1999). 
A further consideration of security in this scheme is the 
possibility of an adversary to forge signatures. Given 
enough messages and corresponding signatures it may 
be possible deduce a pattern and then forge a signature 
of choice. While in practice this may not be feasible, it 
is prudent to design the scheme such that the validity of 
the operator’s public key certificate is relatively short. 
This would require periodic generation of new keys for 
each satellite and recertification of the satellites’ public 
keys by the operator CA. 
 
NMA using Proposed Scheme based on TESLA 
 
In this section we present a proposed NMA scheme 
based on a modified version of the Time Efficient 
Stream Loss Tolerant Authentication (TESLA) protocol 
(Perrig et al. 2002). TESLA uses Message 
Authentication Codes (MAC) to achieve cryptographic 
integrity of broadcast messages. 
The advantage of using MACs is the reduction in 
computation and communications overhead compared 
to the use of asymmetric cryptography. It is additionally 
scalable to a large number of receivers, supporting most 
of the NMA requirements previously discussed. The 
modification we have introduced is the synchronization 
system.  
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 Value is based on reception of packets from 6 
satellites. 
This protocol can support numerous configuration 
options that allow for optimization for certain services 
and required quality of service guarantees. 
Synchronization 
As the TESLA protocol is based on a delayed key 
release scheme, time synchronization is critical and 
directly affects the security of the scheme. We propose 
a synchronization scheme based on the Time of Week 
(TOW) field in the CNAV message header (Refer to 
Figure 2). 
The TOW value is the 17 Most Significant Bits (MSB) 
of the 19 Least Significant Bits (LSB) of the 29 bit Z-
COUNT. In each GPS Satellite Vehicle (SV) the X1 
epochs of the P-Code are used for precise counting and 
communicating time. The Z-COUNT increments in X1 
epochs (1,5 seconds), the 19 LSBs of which indicate the 
number of X1 epochs that have occurred since the 
transition from the previous week. The 10 MSBs of the 
Z-COUNT indicate the current GPS week. 
The value of the TOW count in the CNAV message 
header multiplied by 6 represents the SV time in 
seconds at the start of the next 12-second CNAV 
message (ARINC Engineering 2004).  
For synchronization of the NMA scheme, we define the 
following counters:
11
 
 
AUTHCOUNT = 





16
TOW
floor  
 = 62990K  
 
TIMESLOT = AUTHCOUNT mod 300 
 = 2990K  
 
The duration of a timeslot is 96 seconds, two CNAV 
message sequences. The timing relationships are 
illustrated in Figure 7. 
 
 
Figure 7. Synchronization of Proposed Authentication Scheme 
 
 
Scheme Setup and Broadcast 
The following initialization procedure is used to setup a 
hash chain, such that there is a hash value Kn for every 
96 seconds for 300 timeslots. A hash chain of 300 
values lasts for 8 hours. 
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 The function floor(x) rounds x to the nearest integer 
less than or equal to x. 
A is defined to be satellite PRN ID n 
B is defined to be a GPS receiver 
 
1. A computes K300 = F(s), where s is a random 
secret number chosen by A 
2. A computes K0 by hashing K300 300 times, such 
that K299=F(K300), K298=F(K299),… K0=F(K1). 
The values K299…K0 are kept secret. 
3. A→ B: SigA(K0), K0, CertA 
 
It is assumed that CertA is issued by a Certification 
Authority (CA), such as the Galileo Operator CA. The 
receiver must only accept K0 if it is able to verify the 
public key of A and SigA(K0) is successfully verified. 
 A key disclosure delay of one timeslot is used, such 
that within a given timeslot, key Kn+1 is released in 
message type 60 with the MAC of the message 
sequence. The MAC is keyed with K
′
n+2 and is 
calculated over all messages except type 60 and 61. 
SigA(K0) and the public key certificates for the satellite 
and operator are included in message type 61. Refer to 
Figure 7 and Figure 8 for illustration of the timing 
relationships of these messages and the generation of 
type 60 and 61 authentication messages. 
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M11 M12 M30 M61 M11' M12' M33 M60
K n + 1 K n + 2 K n + 3
K n + 1
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Figure 8. Authentication Message Generation and Verification 
Process 
 
The structures of the type 60 and 61 messages are 
illustrated in Figure 9. 
 
 Figure 9. Message Structure 
 
Authentication and Integrity Verification Process 
This subsection describes the authentication and 
integrity verification process. It is assumed that the 
receiver has already obtained K0 from a series of type 
61 messages. Figure 8 illustrates the generation and 
verification of authentication messages. 
In the following example, the receiver starts receiving 
messages in timeslot i+2. 
F(x) is defined to be a secure hash function 
F
′
(x) is defined to be a secure key generation function 
MAC denotes a message authentication code 
 
TIMESLOT i+2 
Received Messages: 
{M11,M12,M30,M60,M11
′
,M12
′
M33,M61} 
 
1. Obtain Kn+1 from M60 
2. Receiver calculates Kvn+1 = F(Kn). If receiver 
does not have Kn, must verify chain back to K0 
such that Kvn+1 = F(F(..(F(K0))) 
3. Kn+1 is authenticated if  Kvn+1 = Kn+1 
4. No verification is possible at this stage as key 
Kn+2 has not yet been released and 
MAC(K
′
n+2){M11,M12,M30,M11
′
,M12
′
M33 } 
cannot be calculated. 
 
TIMESLOT i+3 
Received Messages: 
{M11
′ ′
,M12
′ ′
,M35,M60
′
,M11
′ ′ ′
,M12
′ ′ ′
M32,M61
′
} 
 
1. Obtain Kn+2 from M60
′
 
2. Receiver calculates Kvn+2 = F(Kn+1)  
3. Kn+2 is authenticated if  Kvn+2 = Kn+2 
4. Receiver generates key K
′
n+2 from Kn+2 using 
key generation algorithm F
′
(x) such that K
′
n+2 
= F
′
( Kn+2) 
5. Obtain MAC(K
′
n+2) from M60
′
 
6. Receiver calculates 
MACv(K
′
n+2){M11,M12,M30,M11
′
,M12
′
M33 } 
7. Integrity of messages in TIMESLOT i+2 is 
verified if MACv(K
′
n+2) = MAC(K
′
n+2) 
 
Alternate Message Configurations 
This subsection proposes an alternate message 
configuration more suitable to higher-rate channels in 
Galileo, facilitating faster time-to-alert. Assuming a 
navigation message structure similar to CNAV, and the 
same maximum broadcast intervals for ephemeris and 
clock correction terms, many more messages could be 
interleaved in the message sequence without affecting 
the minimum broadcast intervals. 
The type 60 message would be included in every 
message sequence of four messages. The type 61 
message containing SigA(K0), CertA, and CertOP would 
be interleaved in the remaining sequenced messages for 
best performance.  
As a new hash value K0+n would be released every 48 
seconds instead of every 96 seconds, the AUTHCOUNT 
and TIMESLOTS are redefined as follows: 
AUTHCOUNT = 





8
TOW
floor  
 = 125990K  
 
TIMESLOT = AUTHCOUNT mod 600 
 = 5990K  
 
Figure 10 illustrates the timing relationships for 
synchronization in 48 second timeslots. 
 
 
Figure 10. Synchronization with Message Configuration 2 
 
Performance 
This scheme was simulated with the security simulator 
developed by Qascom. The values in Table 8 and Table 
9 for Galileo services are indicators of time-to-alarms if 
a CNAV type structure is adopted.  
A summary of the key performance indicators for 
message configuration 1 are detailed in Table 8. As can 
be seen by these results, the time-to-alarms for 
cryptographic integrity failure are outside all time-to-
alarm requirements for class A, B and C SoL 
applications (Refer to Table 4).  
 
 GPS 
L2C 
(25 
bps) 
GPS 
L5 
(50 
bps) 
Galileo 
OS E2-
L1-E1B 
(125 
bps) 
Galileo 
OS 
E5AI 
(25 
bps) 
Galileo 
OS 
E6BI 
(125 
bps) 
Time-To-
Alarm  
96s 48s 19,2s 96s 19,2s 
Signature 
of K0 for a 
given hash 
chain 
288s 144s 57,6s 288s 57,6s 
Cert 
Acquisition 
Time 
(PRNn 
Cert) 
960s 480s 192s 960s 192s 
Cert 
Acquisition 
Time 
(GALILEO 
Operator) 12 
840s 420s 168s 840s 168s 
Table 8. Performance of NMA using Proposed Scheme - Message 
Configuration 1 
 
Table 9 details the key performance indicator for 
message configuration 2, the alternate configuration. It 
should be noted that this message configuration for the 
GPS L2C does not comply with the required maximum 
broadcast intervals. Assuming such a configuration for 
Galileo, cryptographic integrity can be provided at the 
integrity performance requirements for time-to-alarm 
for class B and C applications (Refer to Table 4). 
 
 GPS 
L2C 
(25 
bps) 
GPS 
L5 
(50 
bps) 
Galileo 
OS E2-
L1-E1B 
(125 
bps) 
Galileo 
OS 
E5AI 
(25 bps) 
Galileo 
OS 
E6BI 
(125 
bps) 
Time-To-
Alarm 
(Integrity) 
48s 24s 9,6s 48s 9,6s 
Table 9. Performance of NMA using Proposed Scheme - Message 
Configuration 2 
 
Security of the Scheme 
In this scheme SHA-1 is used as the secure hash 
function F(x). The MAC is a SHA-1 HMAC, a MAC 
based on a keyed hash function. A truncated version of 
the MAC is transmitted, in which the 78 MSBs of the 
SHA-1 HMAC computation are transmitted in 
authentication message type 60.  
MAC truncation has both some security advantages and 
disadvantages, namely that there is less information 
available to an attacker; however there are fewer bits for 
an attacker to predict.  
It is recommended that a truncated value be at least half 
the number of bits of the MAC result (80 bits) 
(Krawczyk et al. 1997), as this is the bound of the 
birthday attack, and it is a suitably high lower bound for 
the number of bits an attacker must predict. The 
truncated value used in the authentication message is 78 
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 Value is based on reception of packets from 6 
satellites. 
bits which is sufficient given that a new hash value is 
used to key the MAC of a given sequence of messages 
every timeslot (48/96 seconds). In addition, the validity 
of the MAC is only one timeslot due to the key being 
released in the subsequent timeslot, making it 
computationally infeasible to forge a MAC within this 
short period. 
The EC-DSA public key algorithm is used for 
distribution and certification of K0. The elliptic curves 
used in this scheme are recommended as a secure curve 
by NIST (NIST 1999).  
Archer in (Archer 2002) presents a mechanized 
correctness proof of the basic TESLA protocol using 
TAME
13
. Archer concludes that the degree of similarity 
of the proof of an analogous protocol to the proof of 
basic TESLA will depend on the degree of difference of 
this protocol to the basic TESLA. The proposed 
protocol does not vary significantly from the basic 
TESLA protocol, except the synchronization of the 
sender to the receiver. 
A security assumption of TESLA is that the sender and 
receiver remain synchronized. This is critical for the 
security of the protocol, as a drift in synchronization of 
the receiver from the sender could result in 
compromise. Our proposed synchronization system 
alleviates this issue. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Navigation Message Authentication (NMA) is a good 
method to provide scalable, security services and anti-
spoofing mitigation functionality to the civil 
community. 
We have presented two NMA schemes: a scheme based 
on digital signatures and a modified version of the 
TESLA protocol. The proposed TESLA protocol has a 
number of advantages over the digital-signature 
approach in terms of computational efficiency, security, 
flexibility and time-to-alert. 
While the proposals were based on the CNAV message 
structure of the GPS L2C, these authentication concepts 
can be applied to Galileo as well as Space and Ground-
based augmentation systems. While the time-to-alarms 
of the proposed schemes appear to fulfill requirements 
for some classes of SoL applications, the actual 
performance for Galileo will depend heavily on chosen 
the navigation data structure.  
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